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Part of God's being "good to us" includes God's not depersonalizing us by
robbing us of our volitional agency.
Some people, including Thomas Nagel according to his published writ
ing, do not want to live in a universe governed by God, and they have
this striking want resolutely, after careful consideration. God would not be
good at all in suppressing their personal agency in this regard; in fact, God
would then be a depersonalizing tyrant. If we hold, however, that God
has no moral obligations toward human, we will then be open to hold
ing that God need not respect human agency or robust, freedom-based
love among and toward humans at all. We then risk obscuring the vast
difference between a morally perfect God worthy of worship and a dep
ersonalizing tyrant (regardless of that tendency in various medieval and
later Reformed theologians). That would be a horror indeed. We all need a
straightforward conception of God that clearly defeats that horror. Other
wise, an account of horror-defeat will seem to be a parlor game at best or,
at worst, our alleged horror-defeater will be the worst Horror.
The apostle Paul is right in suggesting that this world has been sub
jected to frustration and futility by God, in divine hope that people will
enter into "the glorious freedom of the children of God" (Rom. 8:20-21).
Even so, his God, in honoring "glorious freedom," does not rob people of
their volitional agency. Otherwise, there would be no agents to enjoy the
"glorious freedom" uniting the children of God. We still lack an account
of why God's subjecting creation to futility or defeating horrors is at times
and places so humanly painful, even crushing. If the closing chapters of the
book of Job are on the right track, we should not hold our collective breath
while waiting for the account. We may not be up to an account, or at least
God may have no good purpose served by offering one to us now. Still, we
can take some comfort in the fact that our having conclusive evidence of
divine reality does not require our having any such account, and, in this
horror-drenched world, we should take all the good comfort we can get.

Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, by
Rick Anthony Furtak. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005.
Pp. xii + 236. $45.00 (hardback), $22.00 (paper).
ROBERT C. ROBERTS, Baylor University
This is a beautifully revised University of Chicago dissertation. If, in a
dissertation topic, one is looking for something that connects richly with
a current research focus (not to say craze) that is at the same time widely
interdisciplinary, nicely matched with an interesting historical figure
who has not yet been much exploited in that connection, and of intrinsic
philosophical interest and human importance, it is hard to imagine being
more successful than Rick Anthony Furtak in picking a dissertation topic.
Emotions (even the cool and calm ones) are currently hot in academic
life, and Soren Kierkegaard has much to say about them that is deep and
interesting and not found elsewhere.
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Furtak weaves here a discussion of emotions and ethics (both in a broad
sense), by staging a kind of conversation between Stoicism and some writ
ings of Kierkegaard. Roughly, Furtak accepts the Stoics' theory of emo
tions and rejects their metaphysics of value, and offers an interpretation of
Kierkegaard in terms of this acceptance and rejection. Kierkegaard turns
out to be a kind of Stoic on the question of what emotions are, but radi
cally opposed to the Stoics' understanding of emotions' moral and spiri
tual significance.
Furtak limits himself, in this study, to the religiousness of "immanence"
that one of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors calls religiousness A
(see Concluding Unscientific Postscript), the Socratic kind of religiousness
that Kierkegaard thinks can be achieved without aid of special revelation.
Thus, despite Furtak's personal concern "about (broadly speaking) Augustinian Christianity," this book omits the concepts of sin, atonement, faith in
Jesus Christ as Savior, Christ as the Way, the Holy Spirit, apostleship, and
related concepts from the account of Kierkegaard on the emotions.1 This
is a significant limitation, given that Kierkegaard's self-described mission
for his writings was that of reintroducing Christianity to a partially secu
larized Christendom.
The framework for the book is Kierkegaard's "stages"—the aesthetic,
the ethical, and the religious—and Furtak's strategy is to give a neo-Stoic
account of the transitions between these stages. The primary example of
an emotion is love, a theme that conveniently runs through all of Kierkeg
aard's stages. The emphasis on love as the primary emotion yields a less
individualistic Kierkegaard than we may be used to.
As opposed to the 'isolated self' of the Stoic, the Kierkegaardian self
is open and engaged in a network of caring relationships which de
fine its identity. This is why we betray ourselves when we resist love's
influence: we are who we are by virtue of what we love. (p. 109)
Furtak finds a middle way between a radical voluntarism of the emotions,
according to which we have full control over our emotions and simply
"choose" them, and a radical passivism of the emotions, according to
which emotions just happen to us.
Love is not a product of the will, and the mode of receptivity in
which value is perceived is not one in which the self projects value
outward; but passionate impressions are not so coercive that we are
entirely passive in yielding to them, either. (p. 120)
Furtak thus also rejects a subjectivism or constructivism of value accord
ing to which values have no objective standing in the nature of things, but
are just human projections or inventions. He twice quotes Fear and Trem
bling to the effect that
If underlying everything there were only a wild, fermenting power
that, writhing in dark passions, produced everything, be it significant
1Personal communication. I am indebted to Furtak for help with this review.
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or insignificant; if a vast, never appeased emptiness hid beneath everything—what would life be then except despair? (quoted on p. 50,
and again on p. 117)
Similarly, Furtak rejects Rortyan constructivism:
[Richard] Rorty's ideal of "giving birth to oneself" is the pipe dream
of a defiant pride, a goal predicated upon an untenable belief in the
absolute freedom of the will; "passionate acceptance" of one's re
ceived individuality, on the other hand, is based on a more realistic
appreciation of what is not up to us. (pp. 106-107)
Furtak has a strong internalist requirement of justification for rationality
of emotions (see more below).
The book contains 60 pages of scholarly footnotes for just 140 pages of
text, making it a rich guide for someone interested in studying what Ki
erkegaard thinks about emotions. According to the Stoics, emotions have
two main parts. The first is an impression or perception of something as hav
ing a certain value, either positive or negative. In this first aspect, then, joy
would be an impression of some state of affairs as good, and fear an im
pression of some impending evil. Because value is an important aspect of
the object of the impression, the impression is likely to have a motivating
character: the subject will undergo some urge to pursue the good or avoid
the evil, for example. But the impression itself is not yet an emotion; it is
only a "prepassion" or "first movement"—a sort of potential emotion. The
second necessary condition for a mental state's being an emotion is the sub
ject's assent to the value-impression. The subject has to take a "yes"-attitude
toward the impression; a value-impression from which the subject dissents,
or withholds assent, is not an emotion. Thus the Stoics think of emotions as
a kind of perceptual judgment concerning a state of affairs in the dimension
of its value. They also think that all emotions are about contingent states of
affairs that are outside of human control.
The Stoics hold that all emotions are false judgments. The reason is that
their metaphysics of value says that only two kinds of thing have value. The
universe as a whole, being a beautifully harmonious and rational system,
is one good thing. Another is the mind of the perfected Stoic sage, which
mirrors the universe in its rationality and harmony. One would think that
either of these could be the proper object of joy (and perhaps the failure
of most of our minds to reflect the rational order of the universe a proper
object of regret), but the Stoics don't, to my knowledge, dwell on this; and
if they admitted it, they would have to think of the mental state as some
thing other than an emotion; perhaps it is a "eupatheia." (The state of the
universe as a whole is certainly beyond our control, but it isn't contingent;
the conformity or not of the sage's mind to the order in the universe is con
tingent and is the only thing that is officially within human control.) Some
times they seem to make it a necessary condition of an emotion that it be
disturbing. At any rate, the vast majority of emotions, being attributions of
values to situations other than the state of the whole universe or the state of
people's minds, are false judgments because they attribute goodness or bad
ness to things that are neither good nor bad. In emotions, contingent situa
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tions falsely appear to be good or bad, and are affirmed to be such, because
of distortion created by the subject's personally involved point of view.
The conversation with Stoicism shapes Furtak's interpretation of the
transitions from the aesthetic to the ethical stages, and from the ethical to
the religious. Furtak follows Aristotle and Kierkegaard, against the Sto
ics and Kant, in making proper emotion-dispositions an essential aspect
of the well formed, mature personality. The Stoic theory of the emotions
provides the clue to the first transition. The problem with Kierkegaard's
aesthete, on the neo-Stoic interpretation, is that he lacks a history of as
senting to his emotional impressions (see pp. 74, 87-88), so the prescrip
tion for his transition to the ethical stage will be to start assenting to them.
Furtak derives a conception of the second transition by inverting what he
takes to be the Stoics' argument concerning their metaphysics of value.
Only the religious person, who grasps love as a metaphysical structure of
the universe, is adequately justified in taking his emotional life to be valid.
The first transition gives the emotional life structure (thus character), the
second gives it a ground (thus justification).
Kierkegaard's aesthete characteristically "plays" with his emotions. He
takes a kind of spectator's view of them, "entertains" them so as to be en
tertained by them. He is preoccupied with keeping his experiences fresh
and interesting, and thinks he can do so by preventing them from becom
ing dispositions, getting settled and characteristic of him. So he is an enemy
of the kind of stolidity that he associates with having character traits. A
prime example of this is his attitude toward romantic love. He is afraid
that love will get old and lose its charm, and so he avoids commitment
above all else.
How does withholding assent from an emotional impression pre
vent character-development? It seems to me the effect must be based in
the structure of romantic love as an evaluative perception. Let us say the
propositional content of this impression is something like the following:
She is uniquely splendid and precious; she is mine and I am hers forever.2 The
qualifiers uniquely and forever have special bearing on character, inasmuch
as they imply monogamous faithfulness, commitment, and steadfastness
over time. The aesthete likes being charmed by his romantic love, but he
is threatened by its implications. A plausible solution to his dilemma is to
refuse to let the impression be more than an impression—to withhold his
assent from it. Even if the neo-Stoic is wrong in denying that romantic love
without assent is an emotion, there seems to be something to the idea that
withholding assent is a way of preventing the emotion from getting a grip
on one's life. Other emotions will also have character-bearing propositional
content. Instances of Christian joy may be examples. The apostle Paul seems
to think that redemption by the death of Jesus has implications for one's
character (and thus behavior); were a person to rejoice about such redemp
tion, and assent to the propositional content of that joy, he would be in for
some strenuous living. So a religious aesthete might find it convenient to
"toy" with such joy, feeling it in the excitement of the religious service but
with a certain caution about assenting to its propositional content.2
2In this analysis I am elaborating on Furtak, who does not offer analyses of the
content of emotions that is supposedly assented to.
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But the neo-Stoic thesis that assent to emotions is the key to characterdevelopment needs to be qualified in several ways. First, not all emotions
have character-implying propositional content. People rejoice, for example,
over the convenience of their new cell-phone. Such an emotion seems to
apply little pressure for ethical development. Assenting to it will not tend
to lift one from the aesthetic to the ethical stage. Second, some emotions
have content that is contrary to ethical development. Envy has a justifiably
bad reputation, at least in Christian circles, in large part because what it
"says" is false: it says, my value as a person depends on my equaling or bettering
so-and-so's X (beauty, intelligence, success, etc.), so it would be good for me if soand-so did not possess X. Furtak sometimes refers to "giving or withholding
assent to immediate emotional impressions" (italics added), but does not
make the extirpation of morally low-grade emotions a theme. Third, the
object of some character-implying emotions needs to be very particular for
assent to that emotion to be good for one's character. A person who assents
to romantic love will develop character only if the person toward whom
he directs that love is the same person across time. It is better for a col
lege professor s character to dissent from romantic feelings that he may feel
from time to time toward some of his beautiful students. This more "Stoic"
aspect of character-development by extirpation of selected emotions gets
very little treatment in Wisdom in Love.
But assent to values itself seems to be only an aspect of moral character.
Surely, many people assent to the content of the emotions they feel in their
better moments, like compassion, or outrage at injustice, without being
fully compassionate or just. The best emotions need to be steady, and they
need to be connected to action-dispositions. We might say that felt com
passion that does not dispose one to compassionate action thereby shows
that the subject does not "really" assent to its propositional content. But
this response raises the question about what assent is, after all. Is the as
sent the neo-Stoic has in mind just a disposition sincerely to say "yes" to
the emotion's content, or is something more (something "deeper") need
ed? The neo-Stoic concept of assent also needs work, and I would predict
that once the work is done, we will be well beyond anything people would
usually call assent.
I wonder, too, whether some ethical virtues do not involve the capacity
for partially fictional emotions—ones from whose propositional content
the subject withholds assent. Let's say that gratitude involves crediting a
person with benevolent intentions for the action for which one is grateful
to the person. Perhaps it is virtuous to be "generously" grateful—that is,
to feel gratitude in situations where one is not sure that the giver was be
nevolently motivated, or even where one strongly suspects that the giver
was not benevolently motivated.
On Furtak's neo-Stoic interpretation, the second transition—from the
ethical to the religious—is a matter of standing a certain "Stoic" argument
about values on its head. The argument goes like this:
Only if some emotion is true, does some state of affairs have value.
But no emotion is true, so no state of affairs has value. Love is jus
tified only if some state of affairs has value. Therefore love is not
justified.
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We invert the argument by altering the first premise and denying the
second:
If some emotion is true, then some state of affairs has value. Some
emotions are true, so some state of affairs has value. If some state of
affairs has value, then love is justified; so love is justified.
A succinct anti-Stoic formula would be: Since some emotions are true judg
ments, something in the universe is lovable.
Judge William (Either/Or, volume 2) represents the "ethical" stage. On
Furtak's interpretation, Judge William falls short of emotional maturity on
two related counts. He is a partisan of a merely local morality (p. 87), follow
ing a Hegelian model of morality as Sittlichkeit; and he lacks moral imagina
tion. (The aesthete was characterless, but in his boundless imagination of
human possibilities he had something right.) The problem with a merely
local morality, for a moral realist with classical foundationalist leanings like
Furtak, is that it's shaky ground. You don't know you're right, so if you be
came reflective, the instability of your position would become evident (p.
87); your supposedly solid character would be undermined. This is Judge
William's situation, on Furtak's view. If one could know that something in
the universe is lovable, one would escape both of Judge William's moral li
abilities. How could one know that something in the universe is lovable?
Here Furtak's argument seems to me a little dim, but I think the answer
is something like the following. Certain people, through moral-spiritual
growth that involves both character (seriousness about their emotions) and
imagination, come to see that the underlying structure of the universe is
love. Kierkegaard seems to have been one of these people. This truth is
of course not known through the slick little argument of a couple of para
graphs ago, with its unproven premise that some emotions are true. Rath
er, through living with integrity and imagination, inside one's emotions
(whose structure even the Stoics admit to be that of a truth-claiming percep
tion), one comes to see that the universe is basically characterized by love.
The potential to see this is built into human nature in its interaction with
the universe, and to know this is to have it all, morally: the imagination of
the aesthete, the character of Judge William (both properly transformed, of
course), and the metaphysical foundation of the religious sage.
Is it true that "the tacit premise that something external to our moral
control is of value . . . according to the Stoics, is false" (p. 91)? The Sto
ics think that the universe, in its perfect rational order (which surely is
"something external to our moral control") does have value. See Seneca,
"On Providence." So some Stoics do seem to believe in love, though they
would deny that it is a passion. It looks to me as though Furtak confuses
the Stoics with existentialists like Sartre and Camus.
The concept of love in the inverted "Stoic" argument and in the book
more generally needs work. At least two concepts seem to be run together.
The kind of "love" that is justified if some emotion is true is not agape, but
just concern—for whatever. Furtak writes,
It is not an incidental fact about us that we are loving or caring beings—rather, it is "a structuring condition of the universe of our
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possibilities." Along the same lines, Heidegger3 writes: "It is not the
case that objects are first present as bare realities, as objects in some
natural state, and that they then in the course of our experience re
ceive the garb of a value-character, so they do not have to run around
naked." From the point of view of an unloving [read: affectively flat]
observer, it would not even be self-evident that the external world
exists. (p. 101; the first quotation is from Jonathan Lear)
Emotions all presuppose some kind of concern, some kind of caring about
things; but in this sense even hatred is lo v e-lo v e of the destruction or
suffering of what one hates. The other concept of love, the one that oper
ates in the conclusion that something is lovable, is in the neighborhood of
Christian agape; such a love, if it were true, could function as the ground
of an excellent character and life. Furtak is aware of this distinction and
writes of "love [being] cultivated into a caring, unselfish disposition" (p.
121; see p. 98), but we would like to see careful analysis of the distinc
tion and of how the one kind of "love" may develop into the other. I say
"at least" two concepts of love are run together, because others are also
relevant to the discussion. Kierkegaard distinguishes preferential love
from neighbor love (agape), and of course there are different kinds of
preferential love-friendship, family affection, romantic attachment. But
Furtak does not clarify and use these distinctions. Nor does he deal with
the problem, in Kierkegaard interpretation, of the accessibility of agape
to human experience. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard says that neighborlove was not known to paganism, implying that it is known only through
Christian revelation; but he sometimes also seems to treat it as though it
is naturally accessible.

Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and
Epistemic Status, by James Anderson. Paternoster Theological Monographs,
2007. Pp. xii + 328. $43 (paper).
DALE TUGGY, SUNY Fredonia
As far as I know, this book is the all-time most sophisticated, well devel
oped, and plausible defense of the idea that Christians may rationally be
lieve and know apparently contradictory doctrines. Theological literature
on "mysteries" is too often marred with unclarity, epistemic carelessness
and confusion, and even mystery-mongering, that is, perverse delight in
inconsistency (apparent and/or real). In contrast, this book by a philosoph
ically informed and capable young theologian sparkles with Plantingian
clarity, sobriety, intellectual honesty, originality, and analytic power (and
also, with a lot of Plantingian epistemology, as we'll see.)
3Heidegger's 'Sorge' seems a better term for the generalized disposition that lies
at the basis of all emotional life than 'love.' Sorge (as directed at contingent states
of affairs) is more properly the opposite of Stoic apatheia.

